The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism by Devins, Neal
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2004
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism" (2004). Faculty Publications. Paper 881.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/881
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 131 2004-2005
Copyright 2004 by Northwestern University, School of Law 
Northwestern University Law Review 
Printed in U.S.A. 
Vol. 99, No. I 
THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM 
Neal Devins· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no federalism constituency within Congress. Not only do fed-
eral lawmakers and national lobbyists gladly sacrifice federalism in order to 
advance other interests, but state officials also "have systematic political in-
terests that often cause them to undermine federalism." 1 In explaining why 
both state and federal officials discount federalism, John McGinnis and Ilya 
Sornin's Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a 
Federal System provides an important and persuasive critique of the claim 
that the national political process inevitably protects federalism. 2 
My comments will extend Federalism v. States Rights in two ways. 
First, I will posit an alternative explanation as to why the national political 
process does not value structural federalism. In particular, I will argue that 
even if the American people were well informed about the benefits of feder-
alism, they would still trade off those benefits in order to secure other pol-
icy objectives. For this reason, I think McGinnis and Somin are wrong in 
suggesting that informed voters would likely value federalism over other 
objectives and, consequently, that the problem with the political process po-
licing federalism is that Americans are "know nothings" who have little in-
centive to learn about, let alone "monitor[,] the federal state balance."3 As I 
will argue in Section II of this Comment, there is no reason to believe that 
the problem with federalism is that the principals (the American voters) 
lack the impetus to check their agents (state and federal officials). The 
problem is more pervasive: No one really cares about federalism.4 
Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks 
to John McGinnis for asking me to comment on his and Ilya Somin's paper and to John and Ilya for 
writing such an important, engaging paper. Thanks also to Jim Gardner and Alan Meese for helpful dis-
cussions about the issues examined in this Comment. 
1 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a 
Federal System, Nw. U. L. REv. 103 (2004). 
2 For a collection of leading articles both advancing and critiquing this "political safeguards" claim, 
see id. at I 03--04. 
3 !d. at ms. 95, 100--01. 
4 In arguing that voters, interest groups, and elected officials care more about underlying policy is-
sues than federalism, I do not mean to cast doubt on the public policy benefits of federalism. After all, 
federalism may be a bit like Iiver-good for you, but something that very few people would choose. For 
additional discussion, see McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 106-112 (discussing public policy bene-
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Second, by looking at congressional responses to the Rehnquist 
Court's federalism revival, I will argue that the Court could successfully 
pursue a more ambitious theory of structural federalism. In short, because 
interest groups, voters, and elected officials care more about underlying pol-
icy issues than about structural protections, there is no federalism constitu-
ency to block the Rehnquist Court's reinvigoration of federalism. This 
conclusion is in tension with McGinnis and Sornin's contention that federal 
and state officials strongly support deferential judicial review of federalism 
issues and, as such, might resist additional judicial tightening of Congress's 
powers. 
II. FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
Americans have low levels of political knowledge and almost no 
knowledge of the division of power between federal and state govem-
ments.5 Extrapolating from social science research on political knowledge, 
McGinnis and Sornin offer a common sense explanation for voter ignorance 
on federalism: Unlike issues such as gun control, same sex marriage, and 
the death penalty, federalism is "too abstract and complicated to engage the 
passion of citizens."6 What, then, of Americans who are well-informed 
about the federal-state balance, including the benefits of federalism outlined 
in Federalism vs. States' Rights? Would they trade off federalism for other 
objectives? 
The answer to this question is important. One premise of the principal-
agent theory that animates McGinnis and Somin's analysis is that informed 
Americans would not sacrifice structural federalism. Otherwise, there 
would be no need for judicial enforcement of federalism to protect the in-
terests of voter/principals. Voter/principals, instead, would simply be part 
of a governmental system that regularly discounts federalism. Under this 
scenario, the Supreme Court might still protect federalism. But the ration-
ale for such protection would not be moored to principal-agent theory. The 
justification for judicial protection of federalism, instead, would be tied to 
judicial efforts to advance the public interest or the Court's belief that the 
text and original meaning of the Constitution mandate judicial enforcement 
of federalism. 7 
fits of federalism); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1194-1200 (2001) (explaining how judicial enforcement of fed-
eralism helps ensure that legislation serves the public good, not simply private interests). 
5 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 95-96 (citing social science research). 
6 !d. at 96. 
7 McGinnis and Somin view their principal-agent argument as a "supplement to analyses of text and 
original meaning." McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 92. They also back public interest justifica-
tions for judicial enforcement of federalism, noting that "the goals of state and federal officials are not 
always congruent with the public interest." /d. at 91. For an article of mine advancing a public interest 
justification for judicial enforcement of federalism, see Devins, supra note 4, at 1194-1200. 
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McGinnis and Somin, to their credit, call attention to some of the rea-
sons that informed voters might subordinate federalism to substantive pol-
icy objectives. They note that our "mass culture has largely extirpated state 
differences" and that "sentiments that may have previously motivated citi-
zens to take an interest and protect federalism have faded. "8 They also rec-
ognize that citizens are more interested in policy issues like civil liberties 
than they are in "reviving the original constitutional structure."9 For the 
most part, however, McGinnis and Somin link this discounting of federal-
ism to voter ignorance about federalism and its benefits. Indeed, consistent 
with the principal-agent theory that grounds their argument, they suggest 
that informed voters might not subordinate federalism. 
McGinnis and Somin offer no direct proof for this proposition. Rather, 
they simply note that "even ... those who would prefer a consistent respect 
for federalism to their particular first order substantive policies" might nev-
ertheless discount federalism because "they have no assurance that their po-
litical opponents will similarly respect federalism." 10 I have no doubt that 
this claim is correct. At the same time, this claim speaks only to "those 
who would prefer a consistent respect for federalism." The more important 
question is whether a credible commitment to federalism would prompt 
most informed voters to place federalism ahead of their preferred substan-
tive policies. That question is never considered by McGinnis and Somin. 
Moreover, their conclusion seems contrary to the historical record and in 
tension with their claim that citizens "lack the attachments to their states 
that may have motivated them to pay attention to issues of federal structure 
in the past." 11 
Voters, even those who understand and value federalism, may never-
theless have strong overriding preferences about one or more substantive is-
sues. Single issue voters are a classic and extreme example of this 
phenomenon. These voters are willing to subordinate secondary prefer-
ences (including federalism) in order to secure their first order preferences 
(typically the environment, civil rights, gun control, or abortion). Consider, 
for example, abortion rights. Pro-life voters embrace the pro-life agenda 
sometimes by supporting and other times by opposing measures that rely on 
an expansive view of congressional power. Partial birth abortion bans are 
approved and freedom of choice legislation resisted--even though both 
measures rely on broad understandings of congressional power. Likewise, 
pro-choice voters embrace the pro-choice agenda, opposing partial birth 
bans and supporting freedom of choice legislation. These voters, in other 
words, are "willing to contemplate the exercise of power by either level of 
8 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 96. 
9 /d. at 97. 
10 /d. at 100. 
11 /d. at 96; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing why McGinnis and Somin 
think that voters might discount structural federalism). 
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government, depending upon which level can more persuasively demon-
strate that it can do the better job."12 
Single issue voters are certainly the exception, not the rule. But the 
willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to manipulate federalism in 
order to secure preferred substantive policies is the rule. Indeed, the his-
torical record is so overwhelming that it is hard to believe that a majority of 
informed voters would suspend their personal policy preferences in order to 
reap the benefits of structural federalism. 
The propensity of the American people to pay more attention to desired 
results than to which level of government is acting on their behalf dates 
back to the Framers. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
claimed that if either the state or federal government "invaded" their rights, 
citizens "can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress."13 Under 
this view, the state and federal government would compete with each other, 
and the people would decide which level of government would predomi-
nate. Accordingly, during the early Republic, the "rule of thumb seemed to 
be, when one's rivals or enemies were in control of the central government, 
one was prone to savor states' rights, but when one's own faction was in 
control, the doctrine lost its zest." 14 
Consider, for example, the Louisiana Purchase. 15 Northern Federalists, 
proponents of centralized federal power, and Jeffersonians, who consis-
tently advocated in favor of states' rights, flipped their normal positions 
when fighting over the Purchase. Northerners feared that the Purchase 
would shift power to the South and the West and, accordingly, embraced 
states' rights. Jeffersonians, in contrast, thought it more important to com-
plete the Purchase than to run the risk of waiting for a constitutional amend-
ment that would incorporate the Purchase into the Union. 
This pattern of shifting constitutional positions on federalism runs 
through American history. Rather than adhere to a consistent position on 
federalism, Americans have always let their views on first order policy pri-
orities dictate their views on federalism. Before the Civil War, abolitionists 
opposed federal fugitive slave laws on states' rights grounds (while pro-
slavery forces embraced this exercise of federal power). 16 After the start of 
the Civil War, however, abolitionists embraced nationalistic solutions and 
12 James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Func-
tional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1010 (2003). 
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). For addi-
tional relevant quotes from the Federalist Papers, see Gardner, supra note 12, at I 088-89. 
14 FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 48 (2000). For examples of this prac-
tice during the early Republic, see id. at 27-70. 
15 This paragraph is based on Forrest McDonald's account of the Louisiana Purchase. See id. at 
58---{)2. 
16 See id. at 158---{)J; Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National 
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1015, 1025 
(1997). 
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pro-slavery forces espoused states' rights arguments. Likewise, before 
workers could turn to the federal government during the New Deal, tum-of-
the-century progressives "strove to curb the power of entrenched corporate 
wealth" (and federal government support for big business) by embracing 
states' rights. 17 Today, progressives invoke federalism in order to secure 
gains made in the federal courts, opposing nationwide bans on partial birth 
abortion and same sex marriage as an improper intrusion on state preroga-
tives.18 When pursuing judicial invalidations of state abortion laws and 
state restrictions on gay rights, however, progressives embraced national 
standards. 
For their part, elected officials ostensibly committed to federalism have 
proven quite willing to sacrifice this commitment in order to secure desired 
policy goals. Consider, for example, the Reagan administration. On the one 
hand, the administration strongly backed federalism-issuing an executive 
order on federalism, pushing for state control of federal grants, and asking 
the Supreme Court to return power to states on abortion, school desegrega-
tion, and prayer. 19 Despite this commitment to federalism, the administra-
tion was willing to intervene at the state and local level to advance its own 
agenda. In the Baby Doe Case, the administration unsuccessfully argued 
that federal standards, not state and local ones, ought to govern medical de-
cisions involving infants born with severe handicaps.20 The administra-
tion's enforcement of its federalism executive order was also sporadic; 
sometimes the administration seemed willing to back business interests at 
the expense of the executive order. Former Assistant Attorney General 
Douglas Kiniec provides a revealing account of one of these episodes. 21 In 
response to a California initiative requiring warning labels on products con-
taining carcinogens, business lobbyists successfully pushed the administra-
tion to conclude-contrary to the executive order-that federal law 
preempted this state initiative. Although the preemption regulation never 
took effect (because of the handover of power from the Reagan administra-
tion to the Bush administration), Kmiec's account highlights why it is that 
presidents are unlikely to value federalism ahead of other policy priorities.22 
17 Eugene D. Genovese, Getting States' Rights Right, ATL. MONTHLY, March 2001, at 82. 
18 Simon Lazarus, Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at B-4 (par-
tial birth abortion); Wayne Woodlief, Divisive Issue Groomed to Kerry's Edge, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 
I, 2004, at 39 (same sex marriage). 
19 See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 68-69, 134-35, 202--04 
(2004) (discussing, in order, executive orders, abortion, and school prayer). 
20 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
21 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT 143-49 (1992). 
22 For a related argument involving the separation of powers, see Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the 
Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REv. 17 (1995) (arguing that the pursuit of preferred policy 
objectives makes it impossible for presidents to consistently enforce a unitary vision of the separation of 
powers). 
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The Reagan administration's practices are hardly unusual. George W. 
Bush's administration's support for national standards on same sex mar-
riage, physician-assisted suicide, and partial birth abortion are recent exam-
ples of this phenomenon.23 Likewise, notwithstanding the fact that 
Republicans took over Congress in 1994 by running on the anti-big gov-
ernment "Contract with America," Republican lawmakers strongly backed 
national standards on tort reform, telecommunications reform, and numer-
ous criminal law initiatives.24 
The willingness of Republican lawmakers and the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to subordinate federalism, in part, is tied to their respective 
beliefs that the nationalist measures they support are politically popular. 
Consider, for example, Congress's enactment of sex offender notification 
laws as well as legislation prohibiting carjacking and gun possession near 
schools. Lawmakers backed these laws because they would bolster their 
position with voters.Z5 In other words, the failure of the political process to 
police federalism is not simply about the incentives of states, interest 
groups, and federal officials inside the Washington, D.C. beltway.26 The 
problem is also tied to the fact that self-interested voters are able "to move 
freely from one level of government to another in an attempt to find the 
level at which they might try most advantageously to get what they want."27 
Unless these voters perceive that the benefits of federalism outweigh their 
first order substantive policies, they will trade off federalism (even if they 
think that there is a credible commitment to enforce it). 
For this very reason, there is no federalism constituency pushing law-
makers to embrace a broad or narrow view of federal power.28 Voters, in-
23 McGinnis and Somin point to these three episodes as instances where the "subordination of fed-
eralism to other goals" might not take place if there was "a credible commitment to enforcing federal-
ism." McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 99. For reasons detailed in this section, I think that informed 
voters might well trade off federalism even ifthere was a credible commitment to enforce it. 
24 See Forgotten Federalism, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 7, 1995, at 16 (tort reform and criminal law); 
Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle over Reform Heats up, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at F7 
(tort reform); Edmund L. Andrews, Overhaul Backed in Communication, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at 
AI (telecommunications reform). 
25 See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offen-
sive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512-15 (200 I) (explaining lawmaker support for so-called position-taking legis-
lation, that is, legislation that is enacted because it allows lawmakers to make pleasing statements to 
voters); William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 145 (1998) (discussing congressional support for Megan's Law and car-
jacking legislation). 
26 Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note I, does a wonderful job of illustrating those incentives. 
I too discuss those incentives, focusing on the problem of interest group-driven legislation, in Devins, 
supra note 4, at 1194-1200. 
27 E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 10-11 (1960). 
28 See Whittington, supra note 25, at 509-18; Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explain-
ing Why Senate Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1318-24 (2002). For additional discussion, see infra notes 44-48 and accom-
panying text. 
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terest groups, and political parties look to democratic outlets to pursue fa-
vored policy initiatives. Unless judicial interpretations foreclose the pursuit 
of first order policy priorities, it is unlikely that lawmakers will formally 
and consistently embrace a broad theory of federalism. Likewise, unless 
their substantive policy agenda is threatened, presidents will not use their 
bully pulpit, veto power, or control over federal agencies to advance a co-
herent vision of federalism. 
To summarize: The political process will not police structural federal-
ism. Elected officials invoke federalism when it comports with their sub-
stantive policy preferences, but they otherwise do not care about the 
federal-state balance.29 Interest groups and voters will pursue favored pol-
icy objectives at whatever level of government will embrace their agenda. 
In other words, the problem with federalism is far more pervasive than the 
principal-agent problem identified by McGinnis and Somin. Beyond 
"know nothing" voters who have little reason to learn about the workings of 
government, federalism is destined to be a second order concern. Informed 
voters might well subordinate federalism in order to pursue favored poli-
cies--even if they knew that federalism would be consistently enforced. 
More telling, those who have incentive to understand the workings of our 
system of government and manipulate that system for their advantage (in-
terest groups and politicians) nonetheless have little stake in federalism. 
By providing additional support for McGinnis and Somin' s claim that 
the political process does not value federalism, the above discussion makes 
clear that the policing of federalism can only take place in the courts. And 
while I agree with McGinnis and Somin that neither states nor voters are 
likely to check federal officials on federalism-related issues, I think their 
principal-agent theory is off the mark. Federalism's second class status is 
now and has forever been a byproduct of the fact that both voter/principals 
and elected officials/agents place immediate first order policy priorities 
ahead of a coherent vision of governmental power. The question remains: 
How should the courts police federalism? That is the subject of the next 
Section. 
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERALISM: LESSONS FROM THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 
Assuming that federalism is undervalued in the political process, 30 how 
should the Supreme Court protect federalism? In addressing this issue, I 
29 In addition to examples discussed in the text, opponents of school desegregation have long em-
ployed the banner of "states' rights" in framing their opposition to Supreme Court rulings. Prominent 
examples include the "Southern Manifesto" in which Southern congressmen expressed their disapproval 
of Brown and Richard Nixon's efforts to appeal to Southern voters by attacking Court decisions limiting 
local control of school systems. For a recent and worthwhile history, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
3° For some, the fact that federalism is not especially salient in the political process means that the 
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will focus on a very practical question: How far can the Supreme Court go 
in preserving the federal-state balance? 
Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Supreme Court must make 
sure that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their 
elected officials. 31 Otherwise, the Court risks a political backlash-one that 
will almost certainly undo any doctrinal innovations that it might pursue.32 
With respect to federalism, can the Court advance an expansive theory 
without risking political reprisals? 
For Justices interested in expanding judicial protections of federalism, 
Federalism vs. States' Rights sounds a cautionary note. Although support-
ing judicial enforcement of federalism, McGinnis and Somin's principal-
agent analysis also calls attention to how it is that elected officials have 
strong incentive to embrace a system of government that discounts federal-
ism.33 
Furthermore, by highlighting why elected officials have reason to learn 
the "rules of the game" governing the division of power among federal and 
state governments,34 McGinnis and Somin indicate that increased judicial 
protections of federalism might well provoke a political backlash. Elected 
officials will have cause to countermand the Court while voter/principals 
are unlikely to pay any attention to the Court, and as such, the Court will 
not pressure elected officials to respect the Court's invigoration of federal-
ism.35 
On the other hand, if the focus of Congress, the states, interest groups, 
and informed voters is the underlying policy issue, the Court may have sub-
stantial leeway on federalism questions. Specifically, if federalism is of lit-
tle salience to all affected parties, there is less of a commitment to 
policing of federalism is neither essential to our constitutional system nor a necessary check on private 
interests who seek legislation that benefits themselves at the expense of the public. In this Comment, I 
do not tackle the larger question of whether the policing of federalism is good public policy. My con-
cern is limited to the related issues of why the political process does not value federalism and what that 
means for courts who are interested in policing federalism. In other writings, I have argued that the po-
licing of federalism serves the public interest. See Devins, supra note 4, at 1194-1200. 
31 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83, 
90 (1998). 
32 Social scientists have long argued that political pressures will force the Court to comport with 
policy views dominant among the American people and their elected representatives. For classic treat-
ments of this subject, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 ( 1957); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elec-
tions, 69 AM. POL. Scr. REV. 795 (1975). For more recent studies, see Devins & Fisher, supra note 31; 
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). In citing these studies, I am not 
making the broader claim that the Court takes social and political forces into account when deciding 
cases. My claim is simply that the Court's constitutional decisions "are never for long out of line with 
the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." Dahl, supra, at 285. 
33 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 118-19. 
34 !d. at 97. 
35 On why voter/principals will not pressure elected officials, see id. at ms. 94-100. 
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preserving lawmaker prerogatives. The key question, instead, is whether 
there is a satisfactory democratic outlet in which interest groups, lawmak-
ers, and the American people can pursue desired policies. Indeed, absent 
something as stark as the Lochner era (where Supreme Court hostility to 
New Deal economic policies undermined first order policy preferences)/6 
there is little reason to expect voters, interest groups, or political parties to 
pressure elected officials to take federalism seriously. 
For reasons detailed in Section II, I think federalism is a low salience 
issue. In this section, I will both test this conclusion and explore its ramifi-
cations to Court-Congress relations. By examining Congress's response to 
Rehnquist Court federalism rulings, this Section will explain why the Court 
can ratchet up its policing of substantive federalism without fear of a politi-
cal backlash. In so doing, this section will call into question McGinnis and 
Somin's claims about lawmaker incentives. Rather than push the Supreme 
Court to embrace doctrines that regularly maximize their authority, law-
makers are interested in their substantive policy agenda and little else. 
Sometimes that means working around decisions that invalidate favored 
programs. In particular, rather than challenge restrictive federalism deci-
sions, lawmakers will instead seek alternative ways of pursuing the policy 
initiatives they support. Moreover, when lawmakers disapprove of the in-
validated law, they are likely to support the Court's decision (since their fo-
cus is the case's outcome, not the Court's reasoning). By highlighting the 
lack of lawmaker interest in the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival, this 
section provides concrete evidence to support Section II claims about the 
willingness of both lawmaker/agents and informed voter/principals to sub-
ordinate federalism in order to pursue favored policies. 
From 1995 to 2002, the Rehnquist Court invalidated all or parts of 
thirty-one federal statutes. Along the way, it revived federalism-limiting 
the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and the Four-
teenth Amendment and expanding the scope of state protections under the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 37 For its part, Congress is accepting of 
these decisions. 38 Rather than castigate the Court for limiting its power, 
Congress has largely ignored these decisions. With the exception of deci-
36 See ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106-13 (2d ed. 1994); Keith E. 
Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,525-27 (1998). For a thoughtful argument that many of the laws invali-
dated (while perhaps popular with Congress) were unpopular with the American people, see Barry 
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 
BUFF. L. REv. 7 (2002). 
37 For an excellent oveJView of how this 1995 to 2002 revival of federalism represented a clear 
break from past Court practices, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 576-90 (2003). 
38 Several of the examples contained in this paragraph and the paragraph which follows it are drawn 
from Devins, supra note 28, at 1309-24 and Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers 
Spu"ed on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 52 DUKE L.J. 435, 449-52 (2001). More detailed pres-
entations of the points made in these paragraphs can be found in those articles. 
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sions invalidating the Gun Free School Zone Act and Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, lawmakers hardly ever commented on the precedential im-
pact of any of the Court's federalism decisions. 39 When lawmakers have 
rewritten laws struck down by these federalism rulings, they have accepted 
the Court's decision as final, limiting their revisions to those which the 
Court is likely to approve.4° Correspondingly, today's lawmakers seem 
quite approving of the Court's power to invalidate federal statutes. A recent 
opinion poll of members of the 106th Congress (1999-2001) reveals that 
71% of lawmakers adhere to a 'joint constitutionalist" perspective whereby 
courts should give either "limited" or "no weight" to congressional assess-
ments of the constitutionality of Iegislation.41 
Another measure of congressional acquiescence to Rehnquist Court 
federalism rulings is the limited relevance of these rulings to legislative 
hearings. Confirmation hearings of George W. Bush judicial nominees 
have virtually ignored federalism. The focus, instead, remains on abortion 
and civil rights.42 Nor have federalism rulings prompted congressional 
committees into action. Rather than hold a raft of hearings evaluating the 
ramifications of the federalism revival, these rulings did not affect the num-
ber of congressional hearings held on constitutional questions.43 
To explain this phenomenon, it may be that lawmakers are comfortable 
with judicial efforts to cabin their authority. Today's lawmakers often em-
brace calls to devolve power to the states and otherwise limit the power of 
the federal govemment.44 Another explanation for lawmaker acquiescence 
is that these decisions do not foreclose democratic outlets. Unlike decisions 
on abortion, school prayer, school desegregation, and the free speech rights 
39 See Neal Devins, supra note 28, at 1311-12 (2002) (noting that a June 24, 2002 LEXIS database 
search of the Congressional Record uncovered ten references to the precedential impact of the Court's 
decision invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, sixteen references to the decision invali-
dating the Gun Free School Zone Act, and no more than four lawmaker comments about the preceden-
tial impact of any other decision imposing federalism-based limits on congressional power). 
40 See id. at 1313-14 (noting examples). 
41 Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitution Interpretation , in CONGRESS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., forthcoming 2005). See also Bruce 
G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into 
Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001,29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 127, 145-48 (2004). In sharp contrast, 44% 
of 1960 lawmakers signaled their disapproval of the Warren Court by asserting that the Supreme Court 
should give a "great deal of weight" or "controlling weight" to congressional interpretations of the Con-
stitution. DoNALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
372-73 (1966). 
42 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1328. 
43 Keith E. Whittington, Hearings About the Constitution, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 41 . 
44 This, of course, was the centerpiece of the "Contract with America" that House Republicans ran 
on in 1994 (the year that Republicans took over both Houses of Congress). More generally, Congress 
has responded to increasing skepticism about the trustworthiness of the federal government by embrac-
ing power sharing arrangements that empower states and localities. See Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307,346-59 (2001). 
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of communists, lawmakers who lose before the Supreme Court can still 
pursue their favored agenda without calling for the overruling of Court de-
cisions. 
Consider, for example, abortion. Following Roe, pro-life lawmakers 
could not regulate abortion in the first trimester (let alone outlaw it) without 
calling for Roe's reversal. In contrast, federalism rulings allow Congress to 
pursue the same substantive agenda either by making use of another source 
of federal power and/or pursuing a scaled down version of the invalidated 
statute.45 Indeed, Congress responded to Court rulings invalidating the Gun 
Free School Zone Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act by enacting 
less sweeping versions of the legislation invalidated by the Court.46 
Perhaps more telling, the interest groups which lobby Congress have 
little reason to push for a fundamental rethinking of Court federalism rul-
ings. Interest groups, for reasons detailed in Section II, care about advanc-
ing their policy agenda and little else. Sometimes that policy agenda is 
consistent with a broad view of federal power (when Congress enacts and a 
court validates a law that advances that agenda). On other occasions, an in-
terest group's agenda is consistent with a narrow view of congressional 
power (when a court invalidates a law that advances competing interests).47 
Unless and until court federalism rulings stand as a significant road-
block to the pursuit of favored policies, interest groups will not organize 
around federalism. Instead, interest groups will simply pursue their agenda 
in the forum most likely to validate their efforts. When the Court strikes 
down a federal program on federalism grounds, interest groups may pursue 
state reforms and/or federal reforms that do not run afoul of the Court's rul-
ings.48 
The question remains: How far can the Court go without prompting a 
political backlash? No doubt, the Court can go further than it has gone. 
Unlike McGinnis and Sornin's claims about lawmaker incentives, this Sec-
tion has shown that neither elected officials nor national interests are 
strongly committed to the Court's crafting federalism doctrine that allows 
45 Some commentators have suggested that Court federalism decisions do not foreclose more com-
prehensive federal legislation, so long as it is packaged to avoid the problems identified by the Court. 
See Adrian Yermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1325, 
133(}--33 (2001); T.R. Goldman, Lawmakers Take Steps to Respond After Legislation Is Found Uncon-
stitutional, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8. For additional discussion, see infra notes 5(}--52. 
46 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1313-14. 
47 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 (discussing why it is that neither pro-choice nor pro-
life voters have reason to support an expansive or narrow view of congressional power). 
48 Federal reforms, as noted above, were pursued in cases involving the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act and Gun Free School Zone Act. State reforms were pursued following the Court's invalida-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. See Helen Irvin, 
Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 70 U.S. L. 
WK. 2003 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Mode/for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 
1465, 1473-75 (1999). 
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Congress to define the scope of its expansionist tendencies. In particular, 
Congress is accepting of the Court's federalism revival; correspondingly, 
interest groups have little incentive to pressure lawmakers to limit the 
Court. With that said, there are limits to how far the Court can or should 
go. In the paragraphs that follow, I will sketch some of these limits and of-
fer a suggestion for how the Court might pursue a more ambitious federal-
ism revival.49 
To start by way of a summary: The Rehnquist Court's federalism re-
vival failed to provoke the ire of lawmakers, interest groups, or the Ameri-
can people for three distinct reasons. First, unlike rights-based decision 
making, federalism rulings rarely foreclose democratic outlets. Second (and 
correspondingly), the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival has not pre-
vented elected officials or interest groups from pursuing their policy 
agenda. The Court, while limiting Congress's power, has not sought are-
turn of Lochner era restrictions.50 Indeed, notwithstanding its numerous in-
novations, the Court is yet to limit Congress's spending power. 51 Moreover, 
while limiting Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court has signaled that Congress may make aggressive use of this power to 
protect the interests of women and racial minorities. 52 Third, the placing of 
some limits on Congress reflects populist and lawmaker distrust of the fed-
eral government. During the 1990s, candidates successfully campaigned 
against the inside-the-beltway political establishment. Bill Clinton ran for 
president as a "New Democrat"; Republicans gained control of Congress by 
running on the "Contract with America."53 
In sharp contrast, Lochner era federalism rulings prompted a political 
backlash because they significantly limited the dominant political coali-
tion's first order policy priorities.54 For today's Supreme Court to prompt a 
similar response, the Court would need to do two things. It would have to 
invalidate legislation that powerful interest groups and lawmakers care pas-
sionately about. It would also have to limit Congress's powers in ways that 
49 As I write these words, I recognize that the 2004 presidential elections (and the Supreme Court 
appointments that will follow them) will almost certainly define the fate of the Rehnquist Court's feder-
alism revival. 
50 See supra note 45; see also Ramesh Ponnuru, The Court 's Faux Federalism, in A YEAR AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 131 (Neal Devins & Davison Douglas eds., forthcoming 2004). 
51 On May 17, 2004, for example, a unanimous Supreme Court yet again validated Congress's 
Spending Clause power in Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). Upholding a law that makes it 
illegal to bribe officials at state or local agencies that receive federal funds, the Court rejected the claim 
that the Spending Clause demands that there be some connection between the bribe and the federal 
grant. Concluding that Congress employed "rational means" to safeguard federal funds, the Court up-
held Congress's power to fight corruption at agencies receiving federal funds. !d. at 1946. 
52 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
53 For a detailed presentation of how social and political forces contributed to anti-Congress rulings 
by the Rehnquist Court, see NEAL DEVINS, THE MAJORJTARIAN REHNQUIST COURT, LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2004). 
54 See Whittington, supra note 25, at 509-10. 
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prevent interest groups and lawmakers from pursuing first order policy pri-
orities. For example, a political backlash would almost certainly follow the 
overturning of commerce clause decisions approving public accommoda-
tions legislation and/or the rejection of nondiscrimination requirements 
grounded in the Spending Clause. Likewise, the overturning of the Clean 
Air Act would come at a great political cost. 
On the other hand, a modest tightening of the Commerce or Spending 
Clauses would not prompt political retaliation. When enforcing the Spend-
ing Clause, courts could take a harder look at whether the conditions Con-
gress imposes on the recipients of federal funds are reasonably related to the 
purposes for which the funds are expended.55 Also, by paying closer atten-
tion to whether an economic activity, in fact, has a substantial impact on in-
terstate commerce, the Court could more aggressively police federalism. 56 
That the Supreme Court can go further than it has does not prove that 
increased judicial enforcement of federalism serves the public interest. 
McGinnis and Sornin advance several arguments suggesting that federalism 
benefits the public. 57 In sorting out whether those arguments are correct, the 
Court might want to make use of a common law approach-incrementally 
tightening its federalism doctrine while observing both the political re-
sponse and possible public policy benefits. 
The Rehnquist Court, as it turns out, has done just that. Its initial rul-
ings were tentative. After observing that Congress and the American peo-
ple were comfortable with those rulings, the Court expanded the scope of its 
federalism revival. 58 For reasons discussed in this Section, I think that the 
Court can continue to employ this formula with success. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
By providing an alternative explanation as to why the political process 
does not value federalism, this Comment has sought to strengthen the cen-
55 This is precisely what Justice O'Connor called for in her dissenting opinion in South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Specifically, Justice O'Connor thought that Congress went too far when it 
conditioned federal highway funds on state action prohibiting liquor sales to those under twenty-one. In 
particular, O'Connor thought the law impermissibly burdened teenagers who were not about to drive on 
the interstate (especially since the law did not limit the rights of adults, even those who drove on the in-
terstate). ld. at 214-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
56 By way of analogy, it appears that the Lochner era Congress was prepared to accommodate the 
Court this way. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional 
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 711-12 (discussing Congress's 
willingness to engage in "sustained and increasingly thoughtful" fact finding to supports its invocations 
of the commerce clause). The Rehnquist Court has yet to impose similar demands on Congress, al-
though a 2004-2005 Term case squarely addresses this issue. See David G. Savage, Medical Marijuana 
to Get Justices' Review, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A.20 (noting that the Court will determine 
whether Congress's commerce power extends to regulating homegrown marijuana). 
57 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 106-112. 
58 See Devins, supra note 38, at 462--63. 
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tral conclusion of Federalism vs. States Rights. Specifically, if the federal-
state balance is to be policed, the courts must do that policing. In part, 
problems of voter asymmetry explain why voter/principals will not police 
federalism. Likewise, for reasons expertly detailed by McGinnis and 
Somin, state and federal officials often disregard federalism when pursuing 
first order policy priorities. But the problem is even deeper than McGinnis 
and Somin suggest. Informed voters are also likely to trade off federalism 
in order to advance favored policies. As detailed in Section II, Americans 
have always paid attention to their substantive policy preferences, not fed-
eralism. Moreover, as Section III explains, federalism rulings rarely fore-
close democratic outlets. As such, these rulings do not figure in voter 
efforts to pressure lawmakers to pursue favored policies. Against this 
backdrop, the problem with federalism seems far more pervasive than the 
principal-agent theory advanced by McGinnis and Somin. In justifying 
their theory, McGinnis and Somin must do more than speculate that in-
formed voters would place federalism first if they thought that federalism 
limits would be enforced across-the-board. Instead, they must come for-
ward with evidence supporting their claims about the true preferences of 
voter/principals. 
Correspondingly, McGinnis and Somin go too far in suggesting that 
lawmakers and national lobbies are strongly committed to deferential judi-
cial review of federalism. No doubt, as McGinnis and Somin explain, 
elected officials and national lobbies have strong incentives to understand 
the rule of the game. On the other hand, for reasons detailed in Section III, 
lawmakers and national interests have little sense of stake in federalism. 
Sometimes, the pursuit of their favored policies requires the sacrificing of 
federalism; other times, they see judicial enforcement of federalism as a 
way to limit the victories of their political opponents. Ironically, the very 
reasons that explain why the political process is unlikely to police federal-
ism makes possible active judicial review of federalism. Because voters, 
interest groups, and lawmakers care more about underlying policy objec-
tives than federalism, the court can enforce federalism limits so long as 
there is a democratic outlet available for lawmakers, voters, and interest 
groups to pursue their favored policies. 
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